Category Archives: Real Estate

Commercial Leasing Series: Decoding SNDAs

By Andrea Jacobs on March 12, 2018

Subordination Non Disturbance and Attornment Agreements (SNDAs) often seem like afterthoughts in commercial leasing as they govern the potential future relationship between a tenant and the landlord’s lender rather than the current relationship between the tenant and landlord. SNDA’s, however, should not be overlooked, as they are crucial to protecting a tenant’s interests in the event that a landlord is foreclosed upon and its lender takes over in its place. In the absence of an SNDA, a tenant may find itself at the mercy of a new landlord that has little obligation to honor the terms of tenant’s original lease. Thus, commercial tenants should be aware that SNDA’s exist to protect their rights and should have a basic understanding of how they operate.

As a quick overview, SNDA’s are comprised of three (3) main components, the:

Subordination: Where the Tenant agrees that Lender’s interest in the leased property takes precedence over Tenant’s lease interest in the event of a foreclosure;

Non-Disturbance: Where the Lender agrees to honor Tenant’s lease in the event Lender takes over for Landlord; and

Attornment: Where the Tenant agrees to recognize Lender as its new Landlord.

While most SNDA’s contain largely standard language, there is almost always room for some negotiation. This could be as simple as negotiating for clear tenant protections relative to potential lease defaults, or as complicated as negotiating for protections with regard to promised funding per the lease between a tenant and original landlord. Regardless, it is important that tenants take the time to understand SNDAs in their entirety in order to ensure that their rights are sufficiently protected. Thus, commercial tenants, particularly those seeking long term leases, would be well advised to consult with a knowledgeable real estate attorney both when deciding whether to seek an SNDA and when negotiating the same.

Understanding the Limitations of Chapter 93A: Pre-Litigation Attorneys’ Fees Not Recoverable

By Strang Scott on January 30, 2018

The Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer Protection Act, commonly referred to by its statutory chapter number, “Chapter 93A,” is a frequently utilized statute that provides individual consumers and businesses with a right to bring legal action and recover damages if they are harmed by an unfair business practice. Under the statute, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” or “unfair methods of competition” committed while conducting business in Massachusetts permit the harmed party to recover their actual damages, or a statutory minimum of $25 per offense (whichever is greater), and up to three times such damages for knowing and willful violations of the statute, plus an award for reasonable attorneys’ fees and the costs of the lawsuit. Chapter 93A creates harsh penalties, with a wide-reaching scope, to deter unfair business acts, however, it does have limitations.

Previously, we explained the prohibition on Chapter 93A recovery with regard to a party’s decision to litigate a dispute, rather than settle with the opposing party.

A second limitation on recovery under Chapter 93A relates to the timing of when a party’s legal fees are incurred. Recently, the Suffolk County Superior Court considered the issue of whether pre-litigation attorneys’ fees are recoverable under Chapter 93A in Beninati, et al. v. Borghi, et al. The court awarded double damages to one of the plaintiffs under Chapter 93A. The defendants who were found liable under Chapter 93A then moved the court to reduce the attorneys’ fees award by $170,000 for fees incurred prior to the filing of the lawsuit, relating to “extensive settlement discussions.” The court agreed that pre-litigation fees are not recoverable under Chapter 93A, stating that it “is aware of no authority that permits the award of fees incurred before the litigation began and that do not bear directly on its preparation.” Accordingly, the court excluded the pre-litigation attorneys’ fees from the award.

This case is just one example of the importance of understanding the process of litigating claims and the implications of dealing with an adverse party. Depending on the circumstances of a dispute, it can be wise to initiate litigation sooner to ensure large portions of incurred attorneys’ fees are ultimately recoverable from the party causing the harm. To learn more about scope and application of Chapter 93A, contact an experienced Massachusetts litigation attorney.

Do More: Prevent Your Neighbor from Taking Your Land Through Adverse Possession

By Corey Giroux on September 26, 2017

Does your neighbor’s fence fall on your side of the property line? Did that garage get built on your land? If your neighbor encroaches on your land, you may be subject to losing that portion of your property by adverse possession.

Adverse possession is a common law doctrine through which ownership to property can be acquired by an unlawful possessor exercising possession for twenty years of adverse, continuous, exclusive and uninterrupted use of land such that the lawful landowner has notice that the possessor claims title to the property.

This little-known legal doctrine frequently affects densely populated residential areas where neighbors come and go and property surveys are the exception to the rule. Recently, the New Hampshire Supreme Court had occasion to review its adverse possession jurisprudence in the case of O’Malley v. Little.

In that action, an adverse possessor permanently acquired title to a strip of real estate in Hampton Beach, in a densely packed area of valuable homes near the beach. In 1993, the plaintiff installed a chain link fence between her lot and her neighbor’s lot. As it turned out, the fence was installed across the property line on to the neighbor-defendant’s land. After installing the fence, the adverse possessor-plaintiff frequently used the encroaching area for parking cars, gardening, and other ordinary uses incidental to ownership of land.

In 2010, new neighbors learned that the fence encroached on their land. In response, they called the plaintiff and informed her that her fence encroached and needed to be removed. The plaintiff refused to move the fence. The defendant asserted that he took other action to demonstrate to the plaintiff where the property boundary existed and that the plaintiff’s fence encroached on his land. Nothing else occurred until 2013, when the defendant emailed the plaintiff again and requested the fence be removed. In correspondence, the defendant offered the plaintiff a license to use the encroaching area. Again, the plaintiff refused. Accordingly, the defendant threatened to take action to relocate fence if the plaintiff did not do so herself. The defendant never took such action.

In December of 2013, the plaintiff filed suit to “quiet title,” or officially take legal possession of the encroaching area inside the fence line. In that suit, the defendant asserted that it “ousted” the plaintiff from possession of the disputed land, and thus terminated the adverse possession, through the repeated assertions of ownership from 2010 to 2013. The court disagreed.

Instead, the New Hampshire Supreme Court quieted title in the encroaching plaintiff, finding that “ousting” an encroaching adverse possessor effectively requires more than mere assertions of title. Rather than asserting title, the original owner must take affirmative steps to put the adverse possessor on notice that the lawful owner intends to reassert control or dominion over the disputed area. Having failed to take any such actions, the original owner lost legal title to the disputed area.

While little-known and infrequently asserted, losing title by adverse possession is risk property owners should be aware of, particularly in densely settled areas where unlawful encroachment by neighbors presents a significant risk to property. If you’re concerned that your neighbor encroached upon your land, do your homework. Review your plot plan and deed. Engage a surveyor if you’re unclear whether an encroachment occurred. Then take steps to reassert control over the land encroached upon by your neighbor. If you’ve found that your neighbor encroached on your land, do not let time pass you by. Instead, contact an attorney to help preserve your rights in your land.

Recent Ruling Emphasizes the “Sacred” Procedure of a Jury Demand

By Strang Scott on September 11, 2017

Parties to a summary process (eviction) proceeding in Massachusetts are afforded the right to a trial by jury. Article 15 of the Constitution for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts declares that “parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred,” which applies to court rules and procedures for summary process governed by Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules, and Section 21 of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 185C.

Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court overturned a ruling from the Housing Court and reemphasized the “sacred” right to a jury trial. In Tchad Cort v. Alver Majors, a residential tenant appealed from judgment awarding possession and money damages to the landlord. The landlord filed a summary process action, to which the tenant responded with an answer, counterclaims, and a jury trial demand. At trial, the judge asked both parties if they were prepared for trial and the tenant acknowledged that he was prepared to proceed. After the landlord presented her case, the tenant provided testimony and stated that he would “like a jury.” The judge determined that trial was already underway and thus the tenant waived his right to trial. The tenant and the judge debated the tenant’s misunderstanding regarding waiver and the tenant presented his case. Thereafter, judgment entered against the tenant.

On appeal, the Appeals Court reversed the judgment, holding that a passive waiver of a jury demand, by proceeding with trial without a jury after demanding a jury, is not sufficient to waive a prior plead jury demand. Instead, an effective waiver of a jury demand requires at least an oral stipulation waiving the demand. The Appeals Court emphasized the responsibility assigned to trial court judges to affirmatively investigate, prior to commencement of trial, whether to proceed with or without a jury, rather than starting trial and waiting for a party to object to the absence of a jury.

Self-represented litigants in all courts are held to the same standards as attorneys. As a result, it’s crucial to understand and apply the rules of court and constitutional protections relevant to each action. More often than not, self-represented litigants are ill prepared to do so. In order to navigate litigation efficiently and effectively, engaging an experienced attorney to guide litigation prevents costly errors resulting from the failure to understand available rights and remedies. If you are involved in, or are considering filing a summary process claim, you’re well-advised to contact an experienced landlord-tenant attorney to achieve the best outcome.

New Hampshire Supreme Court Denies Consumer Protection Act Claim in Real Estate Transaction Gone Bad

By Corey Giroux on June 15, 2017

In the recent case of Fat Bullies Farm, LLC, v. Lori Devenport et al., the New Hampshire Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether a series of less than truthful representations made by a prospective purchaser in the course of negotiating a real estate transaction gave rise to liability under NH RSA 358-A, New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (the “Act”).

After a trial in the matter, the Superior Court determined that the plaintiff and counterclaim defendants, Fat Bullies Farm and its principals, were liable for an award of enhanced damages – double attorney’s fees and double costs – pursuant to the Act. On appeal, Fat Bullies Farm and its principals argued that the trial court erred in determining that the conduct underlying the award was sufficient to support liability under the applicable legal standard – that is, that the conduct was sufficiently unfair and deceptive to meet the “rascality test” for determining liability under the Act.

The Act proscribes unfair and deceptive practices in commerce generally, and provides an inexhaustive list of specific types of conduct that give rise to liability under the Act. For conduct not specifically listed, courts in New Hampshire consider the conduct complained of under the Act’s general proscription against unfair and deceptive conduct. When considering whether any particular conduct not proscribed in the Act nevertheless supports liability, New Hampshire courts consider the conduct against the so-called “rascality test.” Under the “rascality test” the conduct complained of must “attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.” As a practical matter the court seeks guidance from the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTCA”) to determine whether such conduct runs contrary to the “rascality test” and offends the Act.

The FTCA test considers whether the complained of activity offends public policy as embodied in other statutes, the common law or otherwise offends established norms of fairness, whether the conduct is immoral, unscrupulous, oppressive or unethical or whether it causes substantial harm to consumers.

In the instant matter, the trial court found that Fat Bullies Farm’s conduct, which consisted of a course of unscrupulous behavior including misrepresenting their intentions for the future of the real property included in the proposed transaction, along with certain other selfish bargaining and business dealing tactics, was sufficient to establish liability under the Act.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s decision, however, and held as a matter of law that misrepresentations concerning future uses of real property to be purchased could not give rise to liability under the Act if not contained in writing, because oral promises concerning real property are unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court noted that even though Fat Bullies Farm’s misrepresentations encouraged property owner to sell the property to them, a course of misrepresentations of intent were not enough to support liability under the general proscription of the Act and the “rascality test” absent more.

Each decision concerning liability under the general proscription of the Act and the related “rascality test” is inherently fact based, and therefore may not serve as strong precedent for future decisions of the Court. Nonetheless, the Fat Bullies Farm decision further underscores the larger body of New Hampshire Supreme Court jurisprudence that demonstrates a pattern of restraint in its application of the Act to business dealings. While other states with similar statutes apply the remedies offered by the Act liberally, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applies the remedy sparingly, and potential litigants should not be confident that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the Act provides redress for unscrupulous conduct in business dealings. To consider whether the circumstances of your dispute merit consideration of a claim under the Act, litigants are well-advised to contact a New Hampshire litigator.

Property Owners and Landlords Beware: New Ruling Clarifies Restriction on Claims to Remove Holdover Owners and Tenants After Foreclosure

By Strang Scott on June 5, 2017

Every eviction action centers on one or both of the following issues: which party is entitled to possession and what amount of damages are appropriate. Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court faced a unique set of facts with regard to the right of possession in Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n v. Heather Gordon, et al., 2015-P-0441, and reaffirmed the requirement for post-foreclosure owners to resort to summary process to remove holdover owners and tenants.

In Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, the occupants of a property in Roxbury appealed from a judgment in favor of Fannie Mae, the party obtaining title to the property after foreclosure, from the Boston Housing Court. The occupants argued Fannie Mae’s common-law trespass claim against them was barred by statute and that Fannie Mae failed to obtain actual possession of the property before filing its claim. The occupants previously entered into a 3-year residential lease with one of the former owners of the property who lost title at foreclosure. Interestingly, the lease was executed after the date of foreclosure and after Fannie Mae filed a summary process action against the former owner. The former owner moved out of the property several months after signing the lease and the occupants moved in. Once Fannie Mae learned the occupants had taken possession, it brought a separate action for common-law trespass against them. The Boston Housing Court entered judgment awarding possession to Fannie Mae.

The occupants argued on appeal that Section 18 of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186 prohibits property owners from bringing common-law trespass actions against holdover former owners or tenants and requires resort to summary process to lawfully regain possession. The Appeals Court agreed with the occupants, reaffirming the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in A.G. v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., 413 Mass. 284 (1992). The Appeals Court held that the former owner occupied the property at the time of foreclosure and that the occupants became holdover tenants. The Court went on to hold that the occupants’ status in relation to the property could not be treated as different or lesser than that of a holdover tenant without attributing actual or constructive knowledge that the occupants knew the former owner did not have title when signing the lease or when they moved into the property. The Court declined to create an expectation that residential tenants would need to take steps to make sure their landlord has title to a property before entering into a tenancy. Under the ruling set forth in Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, post-foreclosure owners may not bring a trespass action against holdover tenants who remain in possession, even where that holdover tenant’s leasehold rights arose after the date of foreclosure, but before final judgment for possession in favor of the foreclosure purchaser.

The Appeals Court also held in favor of the occupants’ argument that Fannie Mae never took actual possession of the property. Actual possession is one of the elements claimants must prove in order to succeed on a common-law trespass claim. In holding for the occupants, the Court reaffirmed the ruling in Dime Savings that actual or constructive possession by an owner asserting a trespass action cannot be maintained when the property is actually possessed by another. The Appeals Court clarified that “actual” possession does not terminate the minute the former owner vacates the property and that the facts presented in Nat. Mortgage Ass’n showed that the execution of the lease and surrender of possession to the occupants did not “indicate [the former owner]’s surrender of possession in relation to others [namely, Fannie Mae] who might claim title.” To the contrary, the facts suggest the opposite and that a gap in time between when the former owner vacated and the occupants took possession cannot signify surrender of actual possession by the former owner. The Court determined that surrender of possession is a factual dispute “to be determined by the intent as expressed by words and acts of all the parties in the light of the circumstances” and the facts presented suggested that the former owner intended to remain in possession after she moved out, regardless of the pending summary process action against her by Fannie Mae.

The outcome of Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n further emphasizes the strict conformity Massachusetts require in connection within regaining possession and the necessity for landlords and residential property owners to undertake summary process to protect and enforce those rights. Evicting holdover tenants and former owners can be a complicated and fact-specific process. As such, you should contact an experienced attorney to ensure the proper timelines and steps are taken to evict a tenant.

Want Out? Prove It: Enforcing Termination Options in Massachusetts Commercial Leases

By Strang Scott on May 22, 2017

A recent Massachusetts Appeals Court decision made clear that the burden of proof relative to the operation of lease option clauses falls on the party seeking to exercise the option regardless of which party moves to enforce their rights pursuant to the lease. In Patriot Power, LLC v. New Rounder, LLC, et al. (2016), a commercial landlord initiated an action for declaratory judgment and breach of contract against a tenant alleging that the tenant did not properly exercise its contract option to terminate its tenancy.

At trial, the jury was instructed that the landlord bore the burden of proof relative to the claim that the tenant had not properly exercised the lease termination option. The landlord objected to the instruction and subsequently lost the case. On appeal, the court sided with the landlord and reversed the ruling on the grounds that the jury instruction regarding the burden of proof was erroneous and prejudicial.

The court held that the fact that the landlord initiated the action for declaratory relief did not shift the burden to the landlord on the underlying action. The court cited a line of cases supporting the proposition that, “one relying on a condition to avoid contractual obligation has the burden to prove the occurrence of the condition.” A proposition made stronger when the facts are such that, “the contractual obligation actually requires an affirmative act by the party seeking to end the obligation.”

As applied to the facts in Patriot Power it is clear that the tenant bore the burden of proof. The lease termination option required the tenant to mail timely notice of such termination in order to relieve the tenant of further contractual obligation. Thus, the tenant needed to prove it had, in fact, complied with the terms of the lease rather than the landlord needing to prove non-compliance. Lease termination option clauses are common in many Massachusetts commercial leases. Both commercial landlords and tenants should read their leases carefully in order to fully understand the obligations and provisions contained within.

Massachusetts Commercial Lease: Maintaining and Repairing Equipment

By Strang Scott on April 28, 2017

It often comes as a surprise to commercial tenants that they are responsible for repairing and maintaining most of the equipment in their commercial space. This can prove both frustrating and expensive when an outdated air conditioner breaks in the middle of summer. To avoid these frustrations, tenants should (1) review the specific requirements in the lease, with an eye on some of the below specific applications; and (2) have a professional evaluate the life and value of each piece of equipment the tenant is required to maintain.

Servicing Exclusively the Premises

When a lease requires a tenant to repair and maintain equipment, the commercial leasing lawyers typically haggle over what specific equipment is required to be maintained. The usual approach is to require the tenant to repair and maintain equipment that “exclusively serves” the rented space. Meaning, the landlord is required to maintain equipment that serves the entire building (e.g. the building plumbing) but the tenant is required to maintain equipment that only serves the space (e.g. plumbing located in the tenant’s bathroom). All buildings and all rental spaces are different, so it is imperative to negotiate, with as much detail as possible, what equipment truly “exclusively serves” the premises. Often, as is usually the case with air conditioning and HVAC, the line between a building system and a premises-specific system is blurred.

Air Conditioning and HVAC

Air conditioning and HVAC units are some of the more contested elements in maintenance/repairs provisions of leases. These systems are critical because they can completely destroy a tenant’s ability to operate its business if they fail and they are often expensive. Moreover, these systems are often tied to other systems within the building and therefore it is difficult to pinpoint who should absorb the cost. As stated above, tenants should enlist a maintenance or engineering expert to determine (1) the life of the air conditioning and HVAC system; and (2) fully describe the interplay between the tenant’s systems and the building’s systems.

Grease Traps

A grease trap, which is a plumbing apparatus used to collect cooking grease before it enters the wastewater system, is particularly important for restaurant commercial leases. In every restaurant lease I have negotiated, the tenant is responsible for cleaning and maintaining the grease traps. Leases typically state that tenants must “regularly” clean and maintain their traps, but sometimes a lease will provide for specific periodic cleanings (e.g. once a month) and even specify the contractor the restaurant owner must use. The above language is fairly standard, but one important piece that is often overlooked is the location of the actual grease trap. While ordinarily located within the restaurant, grease traps are sometimes located in separate areas, in other adjacent units, and even outside of the premises. As such, tenants and landlords alike should discuss and agree to how and when grease traps should be cleaned. Otherwise, tenants will have headaches in trying to access the very thing they agreed to clean, and landlords may have other tenants angry because the grease trap equipment is interfering with their business. I once had a client whose grease trap was located in the basement of an adjoining unit, which happened to be a merchandise showroom. Although my client cleaned the grease trap as required, they also inadvertently dragged grease throughout the showroom, much to the frustration of the other tenant.

Operating Expenses

The confusing crossover between all repair and maintenance issues is when repair and maintenance are covered as part of operating expenses. In larger buildings, tenants will have to pay, in addition to rent, a portion of the landlord’s operating expenses for the building. This portion often covers some of the building’s overall maintenance and repair costs. As such, even if something is not a direct tenant expense, the tenant may end up covering the cost (or a portion) through the payment of operating expenses. It is therefore imperative that tenants ensure their maintenance and repair obligations are consistent with what is covered under operating expenses.

The above is a simplified summary of different approaches to equipment maintenance for a commercial space. Each situation is different, and often different locations will have differing “standards” for how leases are structure. For example, in the Boston area, the standard provisions for commercial leases in Cambridge often differ from those in the City of Boston. In fact, the standards in different neighborhoods in Cambridge (e.g., Kendall Square) often deviate from other neighborhoods (e.g., Harvard Square). As such, it is critical that both landlords and tenants speak with a commercial real estate attorney before executing a commercial lease.

Purchasing At Foreclosure? Foreclosed owners may remain in possession longer under new Housing Court ruling

By Strang Scott on April 10, 2017

By Jennifer Lynn, Esq.,

The required timeline for notice of eviction to holdover former homeowners was recently altered by the Southeastern Division of the Massachusetts Housing Court in Lenders Comm. Finance LLC v. Pestilli, et al., docket no. 16H83SP03779BR. After obtaining title, Lenders Commercial Finance brought a summary process action against the former-mortgagor who refused to vacate after receiving a 30-day notice to quit. The bank moved for summary judgment, requesting the court to enter judgment in its favor because no facts were disputed between the parties and it brought a valid action to evict. In a departure from long-standing practice, the court ruled that Section 12 of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186 requires service of a 90-day notice to quit in order to regain possession from the holdover former-mortgagor properly. The court based the ruling on the fact that no agreement existed between the purchasing mortgagee and the former mortgagor to pay rent for any definite rental period. This ruling is a marked departure from the longstanding principle that a former-mortgagor, as tenant-at-sufferance, is only entitled to “reasonable” notice prior to eviction, and customary practice provided 30 days’ notice to the holdover occupant.

The court’s ruling in Pestilli is an unpublished district court decision and stands only as persuasive authority for future summary process decisions. The ruling, however, may signal a shift in Massachusetts housing courts toward statutory interpretations that provide foreclosure occupants a longer period of notice before the mortgagee regains possession of foreclosed property. Should the standards set forth in this ruling be adopted widely, the timeline for eviction will be extended, creating additional burdens for the foreclosure purchaser and increased overall costs. In addition, the change will likely create an increase in “cash for keys” deals, under which the purchaser offers a deal to the former-mortgagor to vacate voluntarily and to forego challenging the right to possession. Evicting holdover tenants and former homeowners can be a complicated and fact-specific process. As such, you should contact an experienced attorney to ensure the proper timelines and grounds for eviction are present.

Massachusetts Court Holds That Strict Condominium Bylaws Preclude Lawsuit Against Trustees

By Andrea Jacobs on February 13, 2017

Massachusetts Court of Appeals recently affirmed the legal validity of a condo’s bylaws requiring the consent of eighty percent (80%) of unit owners as a prerequisite for owner standing in lawsuits against the trustees of the condominium’s board. The bylaw in question made it functionally impossible for unit owners to sue the trustees as, by virtue of the number of units and number of trustees, it necessitated at least partial trustee-owner consent to reach the eighty percent (80%) threshold. Bettencourt v. Trustees of Sassaquin Village Condo Trust, 59 N.E.3d 455 (Mass. App. 2016).

The Court held that the bylaw was neither unconscionable nor against public policy and thus concluded, “that the consent requirement is valid and the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with it mandates dismissal of their derivative claims.” The Court reasoned that as the plaintiffs, “knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the consent requirement when they purchased their units,” and were not precluded from, “persuading other unit owners and one or more of the trustees to consent to a lawsuit,” that the bylaw was not unconscionable as the, “plaintiffs [had] not identified any aspect of the consent requirement that is substantively or procedurally unfair.” Additionally, the Court noted the bylaw was not “one-sided” as the provision applied to all owners, included potentially aggrieved trustee-owners. The Court also held that condominium trustees do not owe a fiduciary duty to individual condominiums owners, but rather that duty is limited to the board of trustees itself.

Functionally this ruling implies that even the most stringent of condominium bylaws may be read as valid so long as owners were aware of the bylaws at the time of purchase and the bylaws treat all owners the same (including trustee-owners). This ruling should serve as a reminder to current and potential Massachusetts condominium owners that heightened vigilance with regard to the contents of condominium bylaws and other condominium related documents is necessary and advantageous.