Author Archives: Chris Strang

About Chris Strang

Mr. Strang is a founding partner of the firm and specializes in business litigation and construction law. He has represented clients through all phases and forms of dispute resolution including bid protests at the Attorney General’s office, mediations, arbitrations and first-chairing at trial.

Payment Bonds on Federal Construction Projects – Last Date of Work

By on June 3, 2015

When did you last work, for the purposes of filing a timely payment bond claim on a federal public construction project?

The Miller Act, which governs federal construction project payment bond claims, provides that suit be brought within one-year from the day on “which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied by the person bringing the action.” 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(4). The same date is used to determine the 90-day notice requirement for sub-subcontractors and material suppliers. What constitutes labor or material supplied in the context of contract work is often not clear; work performed prior to a subcontractor’s substantial completion clearly counts. Warranty work that involves coming back to repair defects in the subcontractor’s own work generally does not. However, “punch list” items may sometimes include both incomplete contract work (which generally counts) and defective work performed that requires correction (which generally does not count). Sometimes the distinction is not entirely clear, and courts struggle to find a bright line rule on this point.

Massachusetts Federal Court Standard for “Last Date of Work” on a Miller Act Claim

The Massachusetts’ standard is that the one-year statute of limitations will begin to run on the last date on which materials or labor were supplied on the project for the purpose of completing subcontract work. U.S. for Use & Benefit of Lab. Furniture Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 274 F.Supp. 377, 379-80 (D.Mass. 1967) (emphasis added). Corrective work, which is performed for the purpose of making repairs following the inspection of the project, will not extend the statutory deadlines. D.D.S. Industries v. C.T.S., Inc., 2012 WL 2178962, *1 (Mass.Super. June 13, 2012) (making clear that the date of substantial completion is not the relevant date).

For material suppliers, the “date of last work” is the day of last supplying material on the project. The First Circuit, which encompasses Massachusetts federal courts, ruled that where a supplier provides material on a single, federally-owned project, all material supplied will be covered by that project bond.  This is true regardless of whether the material supplier and general contractor treat each delivery of project material as part of one contract or under distinct and separate contracts. G.E. Supply v. C & G Enterprises, Inc., 212 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2000).

Massachusetts considers punch list work provided as a requirement for completion of the project to be contract work; whereas punch list work provided as a correction, repair, or as clean up, is not contract work and will not prevent the statutory deadlines from running. U.S. for Use & Benefit of Lab. Furniture Co. citing U.S. for Use and Benefit of Austin v. Western Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 568, 572-75 (9th Cir. 1964). The value of materials supplied is not relevant in determining whether work was provided to complete the contract or as corrective work. Labor and materials supplied which are ultimately not used in the project still count as “work,” for statute of limitation purposes, so long as it is toward completion of the contract work. In U.S. for Use & Benefit of Lab. Furniture Co., the court considered replacement of plastic identification buttons on faucets and nozzles in a physics laboratory “corrective” punch-list work and could not extend statutory deadlines. The court weighed the following key factors in reaching this conclusion: (1) the buttons were supplied as replacements for buttons previously provided during the original performance of the subcontract; (2)  seven months passed between when the subcontractor substantially completed work and the installation of replacement buttons; (3) four months elapsed after termination of the subcontractors’ contract until the button replacement; and (4) a demand letter sent to the subcontractor’s surety initiated the replacement work. 

An Alternative Standard for Determining the “Last Date of Work” on a Miller Act Claim

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals created a test, which is not the law in Massachusetts at this time, to determine whether labor and material will be considered “contract work” or “corrective work.” The test involves weighing the following factors: (1) the value of the materials, (2) the original contract specifications, (3) the unexpected nature of the work, and (4) the importance of the materials to the operation of the system in which they are used. U.S. for Use of Georgia Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 656 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1981).[1]

This standard was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Southern Steel Co, Inc. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1991). Based on the four above factors, the Court held that work to replace defective locks in a county jail were arguably “contract work” as repair or replacement of defective locks was called for under the original contract; replacement of the locks necessary due to circumstances outside the subcontractor’s control, and were therefore unexpected; that functional locks were deemed very important to operating the jail; and, given the circumstances of the case, the unclear value of the work was immaterial.

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit’s test is applied in Miller Act claims before the District Court for New Jersey. In U.S. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, the court held that operation and maintenance manuals, provided approximately one year after the other subcontract material and labor, were “contract work” within the meaning of the Miller Act, and therefore tolled the statute of limitations until the date upon which they were provided. 999 F.Supp. 734, 747 (D. NJ 1998). In applying the test from the Fifth Circuit, the court held that the value of the manuals ($5,000) was substantial, regardless of the overall subcontract value ($700,000); that contract specifications specifically provided for the provision of the manuals; that an item containing instructions for repairing equipment does not make that item itself a repair item; and that the manuals were sufficiently important to operating the equipment provided under the contract.

What This Means for Subcontractors and Material Suppliers on Federal Construction Projects in Massachusetts

While the Fifth Circuit’s standard is similar to the standard followed in Massachusetts, it arguably applies a more predictable standard for determining whether the work is “contract work.” The benefit of the four-factor test developed by the Fifth Circuit is that it allows courts to assess standard categories for the work and allows flexibility to value more persuasive factors at a higher value, as opposed to missing or unclear factors. The Fifth Circuit’s test could be adopted by the Massachusetts federal court, as there is currently some ambiguity about what constitutes a date last worked on federal projects remains.

The above information is only meant to provide a general summary regarding rights and obligations for recovering under payment bonds provided on federal public construction projects. Because each project presents a different set of facts, the process and outcome of attempting to recover under a project payment bond will vary depending on the circumstances. If you are uncertain about anything regarding your company’s ability to recover under a payment bond, you should contact Massachusetts construction attorney to ensure the necessary steps are taken to achieve the best possible outcome.

[1] In U.S. for Use of Georgia Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Georgia state law, the language of which mirrors the language of the Miller Act.

Online Business Defamation: A New Frontier

By on May 5, 2015

The explosion of business review websites and social media applications brings not only opportunities for businesses to get exposure, but also risks of very public negative commentary.  While everyone is entitled to express opinions, that entitlement does not extend to protection for posting demonstratively false statements of fact about businesses online. It is imperative for business owners to monitor online rating websites and relevant social media forums, in order to quickly spot reputation-harming online business defamation. The longer the posts remain up, the greater the potential harm to the business.   

You’ve Spotted a Defamatory Post- Now What?  

When confronted with online defamation businesses have few options.   First, a business may contact the host website to request removal of the defamatory post.  Websites have a wide range of policies regarding online business defamation. Some will directly review and remove clearly defamatory comments, some will do nothing whatsoever, and some fall on the spectrum in between. Second, the business owner may try contacting the author, to reconcile differences and have them voluntarily remove the post. Finally, if the first two options fail or are seemingly unavailable, the next step may be to consider consulting an attorney and pursuing a legal remedy.

Legal Framework of an Online Business Defamation Claim

In Massachusetts, there are five elements that comprise an online business defamation claim. A business must prove, “(1) that the defendant published a written statement; (2) of and concerning the plaintiff; that was both (3) defamatory, and (4) false; and (5) either caused economic loss, or is actionable without proof of economic loss.” Noonan v. Staples, 556 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2009). Further, a statement is considered defamatory when it, “may reasonably be read as discrediting [the business] in the minds of any considerable and respectable class of the community.” Clay Corp. v. Colter, 2012 Mass. Super. LEXIS 357 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2012). It is also worth noting that, in the context of online business defamation, federal law limits who businesses can hold legally responsible for defamatory postings. Businesses can generally bring a claim only against the actual author of the defamatory comments and not the hosting website where the comments are posted. 

A recent Massachusetts case, Clay Corp. v. Colter (Mass. Super. Ct. 2012), signaled that it is possible for a business to make a viable case against the author of online defamatory comments. In that case the court entered judgment in favor of the defamed business, finding the authors liable for $750,000, to compensate for the defamatory impact to the business. The court, however, stopped short of ordering that the authors remove the offending posts, citing First Amendment free speech as a limiting factor. Thus, while courts are seemingly willing to rule in favor of defamed businesses the First Amendment may impede full relief.    

Takeaway

The Internet can be a business’s best friend just as easily as it can be a business’s worst enemy. Online posts are immediate and far-reaching, so reaction must be swift. Thus, it is vitally important to police what is said online and understand what options and legal remedies are available to protect your business and your livelihood from online business defamation.

For more information contact Chris Strang. Partner at Strang, Scott, Giroux, & Young, LLP.

E-mail Acceptance Can Constitute Contract for Massachusetts Mechanic’s Liens

By on March 9, 2015

The Massachusetts Superior Court recently held that electronic communications and signatures — no less than physically signed documents — can constitute a “written contract” for general contractors, subcontractors and construction material suppliers, within the meaning of the Massachusetts mechanic’s lien statute, G. L. c. 254. In Clean Properties, Inc. v. Riselli (“Clean Properties”), the parties mainly communicated via e-mail. The defendant, a property owner, sought to discharge the mechanic’s lien levied against her property for work performed by the plaintiff, a contractor. Because the parties never executed a paper contract, the property owner argued that the contractor could not meet the mechanic’s lien statute’s requirement of a written contract. The court held otherwise.

Applying the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) adopted by Massachusetts in 2004, the court held that, where there is a clear intent between parties to conduct their business via electronic means, an enforceable contract can be formed when one accepts a written offer via e-mail. Thus, in certain circumstances, an electronic signature — such as one’s name at the end of an e-mail — can have the same legal effect as a physical signature on paper. See G.L.c. 110G, §7(b) (“contracts may not be deemed unenforceable solely because electronic records were used in formation.”).

In Clean Properties, the parties’ e-mail correspondence made clear that each intended to enter into a contract. Specifically, the court held that the contractor had extended an offer by attaching contract terms to an e-mail with instructions for the property owner to respond, if desired, with an acceptance. The property owner replied as instructed and included her name at the end of the e-mail. Because this reply formed a contract under the UETA, the court concluded that the parties’ e-mail communications sufficed to establish a written contract within the meaning of G. L. c. 254. Contractors and construction material suppliers should still be diligent in getting formal contracts signed. However, this is a positive sign for the future use of electronic communications in negotiating construction contracts.

The case is Clean Properties, Inc. v. Riselli (Salinger, J.) (Middlesex Superior Court) (Docket No. MICV2014-04742) (June 18, 2014).